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June 1981 
At the Academy we are attempting to tap all sources of information to 
assure that what we teach is accurate and current. In the process we 
continuously run across matters which are important to know for the working 
police officer. Through our courses we are in contact with a small segment 
of police personnel only and it was decided that an attempt should be made 
to be of service by means of a training bulletin. 
This is the first bulletin and more will follow when sufficient material 
has accumulated or importance of information dictates publication. This 
time the content is exclusively on issues that were before our Courts. 
Needless to say that other topics must also be included. 
If you have any suggestions for improvement or any specific topics you 
would like to see covered, please let us know. 
John M. Post 
Director 
Boggs v. nie Queen Feb. 3, 1981 
Supreme Court of Canada 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has dealt many times before with legal 
questions in connection with s. 238 (3) c.c. which creates the offence of 
driving while disqualified. However, no one apparently questioned the 
validity of the section before. 
The accused was convicted in Alberta of driving while disqualified by 
reason of the suspension of his drivers licence. He appealed this 
conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada challenging the constitutional 
propriety of s. 238(3) c.c. In other words, the accused claimed that the 
offence is not within the jurisdiction of the Canadian Parliament. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the history of section 238 C.C. and came to the 
conclusion that its remains are no more than piggy-back legislation. At one 
time s. 238 provided that the Court, upon a conviction under the Criminal 
Code, could impose the suspension of a drivers license or prohibit a person 
from driving anywhere in Canada. At present the provincial authorities or 
a Judge,upon conviction of a provincial offence, may suspend a driver's 
license or one's right to obtain one. This was the reason why the Court 
referred to s. 238(3) C.C. as piggy-back legislation; the province suspends 
- the Canadian Parliament creates the offence. 
The question to be answered was: " ••••• is Parliament competent to add a 
criminal consequence to a provincial licence suspension whatever the reason 
for that suspension." 
The Court recognized that the obvious intent of creating the offence under 
section 238(3), was to give national effect to a provincial licence 
suspension. In spite of this expediency the Parliament of Canada 
overstepped its legislative authority with the section in its present 
form. 
It was concluded that s. 238(3) C.C. is ultra vires the Parliament of 
Canada. The accused's conviction was set aside. 
NOTE: In B. C., three persons were charged with driving whilst their 
respective driver's licenses were suspended. The charges were 
preferred under the provisions of the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act 
instead of section 238 of the Criminal Code. 
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Boggs v. 'lbe Queen 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that the provision under the Motor 
Vehicle Act creating an offence for something which the Parliament 
of Canada has considered to be a crime, renders that provision ultra 
vires the Provincial Legislature. "The Criminal Code provision 
would eventually be nullified by the provision in the Motor Vehicle 
Act", said the Court. 
(R.v Munroe, Beatty, Jasket June 1980) 
It may well be that the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada, ruling 
that the "'suspension" offence under the Criminal Code is invalid, has 
revived the B. c. Provincial legislation the B. C. Court of Appeal ruled 
ultra vires. 
Written by John M. Post 
March 1981 
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Is a Roadside Demand for a Breath Sample a Form of Detention? 
Must a Demand for the Presence of a Lawyer be Complied With? 
Does Failure to Wait Until Lawyer is Present Provide a Reasonable 
Excuse for Refusing to give Sample? 
Cbromiak v. 'lbe Queen 49 c.c.c. (2d) 257 
Supreme Court of Canada 
In 1972, a Mr. Brownridge was subject to a demand for a sample of his 
breath. He accompanied the officers to the police station and there 
refused to give a sample until he had consulted his lawyer~ He was not 
allowed to contact his lawyer and was convicted of refusing to give a 
breath sample.* He appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada 
which held that Mr. Brownridge was detained and had therefore the right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay (section 2 (c) (ii) Bill of 
Rights). The failure on the part of police to meet the obligation on them 
to allow anyone arrested or detained access to legal counsel provided Mr. 
Brownridge with a reasonable excuse to refuse giving a sample of breath. 
In this case the accused Chromiak was subject to a demand for a breath 
sample under the new section 234.1 (1) c.c., known as the roadside 
breath test. He, like Mr. Brownridge, demanded to consult his lawyer 
before giving the sample. No opportunity for legal counsel was 
provided and Mr. Chromiak was convicted of unlawfully failing to comply 
with a demand made of him under section 234.1 (2) c.c. 
Arguing that there was no distinction between his legal situation and the 
one Mr. Brownridge found himself in back in 1972, Mr. Chromiak appealed his 
conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The main issue, of course, was if the accused was detained within the 
meaning of section 2 (c) of the Bill of Rights, and the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court of Canada and its consequences should be of interest to 
police officers. 
Firstly the Supreme Court of Canada explained that Mr. Brownridge was not 
simply accompanying a police officer in compliance with a demand under 
section 234 C.C., but reviewed that he had been arrested for impaired 
drivin·g. At the time he demanded legal counsel he was under arrest and 
detained in cells. This fact by itself made the Chromiak case distinct 
from the Brownridge one. Mr. Chromiak was not arrested and had been 
issued an appearance notice for his refusal on the scene, and was sent home 
with a sober friend. 
* Brownridge v. The Queen (1972) 7 c.c.c. (2d) 417 
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Chroudak v. '1be Queen 
This left the Supreme Court to decide whether a demand for a breath sample 
causes the person,who is by law obliged to comply with that demand, to 
be detained within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore,is there 
any distinction in this regard between a demand for a sample of breath at 
the roadside and one where the officer demands the suspected impaired 
driver to accompany him for the purpose of a breath analysis. 
The seven Justices unanimously accepted the observations a Justice of this 
Court made in a dissenting judgement in the Brownridge decision. Though 
the opinion was a dissenting one in regards to its conclusion, the defini-
tion of "detention" it contained was considered to be accurate. The 
Criminal Code of Canada uses the words "detain" and "detention" in a number 
of sections and they are "consistently used in association with actual 
physical restraint". At minimum the restraint must be compulsory before it 
can be considered detention. The Justice had observed that to be detained 
means "to be held in custody". He had reasoned that in a lot of situations 
we are obliged to comply with directions a police officer is entitled to 
issue, particularly under provincial traffic laws, and decided that no dis-
tinction existed between such obligations and those imposed by a demand for 
a breath sample under section 234 C.C. 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded in this Chromiak judgment that the 
observations made regarding detention in the dissenting opinion in the 
Brownridge case are equally as pertinent to section 234.1(1) c.c. This 
means that in the absence of compulsory or actual physical restraint a 
suspected impaired driver is not "arrested or detained" when subjected to a 
demand for a sample of breath under section 234 or 234.l(l)C.C. Conse-
quently the accused had not been deprived of his right "to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay" and had therefore no reasonable excuse for 
his failure to comply with the demand of the officer. 
Written by J. Post 
March 1981 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
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INVASION OF PRIVACY, PART IV 1. C.C. 
What is a private communication? 
Who is the "originator" of a private communication? 
What is a "lawfully made" interception of a private communication? 
Must the consent to an interception be voluntary? 
Goldaan v. 'Die Queen (1980} 51 c.c.c. (2d} 1 
Supreme Court of Canada 
The Privacy Act under the Criminal Code creates an indictable offence for 
intercepting a private communication unless the interception was made with 
the consent of the originator or the intended receiver of the private 
communication. 
The Code also stipulates that evidence obtained directly or indirectly as a 
result of an interception of a private communication is not admissible in 
evidence unless it was lawfully made OR the originator or intended receiver 
of the communication gives his express consent to such admission. 
The Criminal Code defines a "private communication" as any oral or 
telecomm~nication where it is reasonable for the originator thereof (not 
the intended receiver) to expect that the communication will not be 
intercepted. 
A Mr. D. was one of the alleged co-conspirators of the accused in the 
offence of possessing and distributing counterfeit U. S. money. D. was 
arrested in the States with such money in his possession. To make things 
better for him and his woman friend he co-operated with police in their 
investigation of the accused. After being brought to Canada he gave a 
written consent to police to intercept private communications between him 
and the accused. He then phoned the accused and met him later with a 
body-pack transmitter on him. Both communications were taped and the 
contents became the main evidence against the accused. 
After Mr. D. rendered his services he disappeared. 
The accused was acquitted at trial, then ordered to stand trial again by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal and he appealed that judgment to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The arguments raised in this case are extremely 
interesting and the judgement of our highest Court settles a number of 
ambiguities about the interpretation of the invasion of privacy provisions. 
- 6 -
Goldman v. "1be Queen 
The Crown had taken the position that the private communications between D. 
and the accused were lawfully intercepted. Due to the consent by D. it was 
not an offence to intercept the communications and the interceptions were 
therefore lawful. 
In the event the Court would find that a lawful interception is exclusively 
one that is judicially authorized, the Crown submitted that the 
communications between D. and the accused were not private. Th.is as D. was 
the originator of them and he was fully aware that they were intercepted. If 
this was the case, the invasion of privacy provisions would not apply at all 
and the conversations should be evidence. 
Defence counsel argued that the required consent to the interception had not 
been proved; furthermore that a lawfully made interception is a judicially 
authorized interception. This means, he said, that the only way the Crown 
could have the communications admitted in evidence was upon proof of express 
consent to such admission by Mr. D. Needless to say, such evidence was not 
available as D. had flown the coop. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the originator of a private 
communication is not, as popular belief has it, the person who dialed the 
phone number, the one who arranged the meeting or the person who started the 
conversation. He may be the originator of a conversation, the meaning of 
which is quite distinct from a communication. A series of communications 
make up a conversation. A communication "involves the passing of thoughts, 
ideas, words or information from one person to another". He who utters these 
is the originator of the communication. 
Therefore, whatever the accused said in the conversations with D. was a 
private communication of which the accused was the originator and Mr. D. the 
intended receiver. 
Said the Supreme Court: 
"If a person with a reasonable expectation of privacy, speaking in an 
electronically intercepted conversation makes statements which the Crown 
seeks to use against him, he has, in my view as the originator of those 
statements, the protection of the privacy provisions of the Criminal 
Code because those statements constitute private communications upon his 
part and their admissibility at any subsequent trial will depend upon 
the provisions of Part IV. l of the Criminal Code". 
The Supreme Court also ruled that when the originator or the intended 
receiver of a private communication has consented to the interception, the 
interception is lawful and the evidence resulting therefrom may be admitted. 
A lawfully made interception is not exclusively one that is judicially 
authorized. 
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Goldman v~ 'Jhe Queen 
In regards to the voluntariness of D's consent to the interception, the Court 
found that he was "a person of some recorded criminal reputation" who had been 
"persuaded by promise of leniency to cooperate with the police in the inter-
ception". If a statement had been obtained by these means, it would no doubt 
have been ruled inadmissible in evidence. The Court held, however, that 
Parliament had contemplated the kind of consent D. gave. 
The Supreme Court said: 
"The consent given under s. 178.11 (2)(a) C.C. must be voluntary in the 
sense that it must be free from coercion. It must be made knowingly in 
that the consentor must be aware of the significance of his act and the 
use which the police may be able to make of the consent". 
Therefore the voluntariness here differs considerably from that prerequisite to 
the admissibility of a statement. The mere consent given on account of promise 
of leniency or immunity of prosecution would not prevent admissibility of the 
intercepted communication in evidence. 
Comment 
Accused's appeal dismissed Conviction 
upheld. 
Although there is now a judicial precedent binding on all Canadian Courts, one 
could have argued on about what was really intended by those who wrote and 
passed these enactments. For instance does this mean that the consent to inter-
cept and the consent to the admissibility in evidence are equal? If so, one 
seems to be superfluous. Like in this case, if consent is obtained, the inter-
ception is lawful and the evidence admissible. Perhaps the only purpose served 
by the provision that the evidence of a communication may be admitted upon ex-
press consent, is to adduce such evidence where the interception was unlawful. 
It seems then that the only purpose consent to admission in evidence serves is 
where the interception was unlawfully made. 
The Courts did not allude to this, but another argument could be advanced in 
support of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in regards to the 
meaning of the phrase, "lawfully made interceptions". The finding of the Court 
was very consistent with the interpretation of "lawful" in other provisions of 
criminal law. Anything that is not contrary to law is lawful but where Parlia-
ment only will permit something if the letter of the law has been followed, it 
will use the phrase "by law". Section 517 c.c. is a prime example of this. It 
provides that anyone who possesses property .. by law" is for the purpose of theft 
the owner of that property. In the Scott* case the possessor of the property 
stolen was named as the owner in the information as he had possession by means 
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Goldman v. 'Die Queen 
of a civil contract with the real owner. This, the Court held, made him the 
"lawful" possessor but not a possessor "by law". A possessor by law is a person 
who possesses something because of a specific provision in legislation that 
makes him the possessor, e. g. executor of an estate, a peace officer who has 
seized goods the law stipulates he can seize, etc. 
* R. v. Scott 1970 3 c.c.c. 109 
Written by John M. Post 
March 1981 
- 9 -
TO TELL THE TRUTH 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY - PERJURY - CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE 
ISSUE ESTOPPEL 
R. v. Gordon 3W.W.R. (1980] 655 
Alberta Queen's Bench 
The Accused was tried by a Judge and Jury of having robbed a Mr. M. of a 
wallet and content, a jacket and a wrist watch. A Mr. B. was the companion 
of Mr. M. at the time of the alleged robbery, but nothing was taken from 
him. The Crown, of course, subpoenaed Mr. B. but he could not be located 
for service and the trial went ahead without him. 
The accused testified that the items he was supposed to have taken from 
Mr. M. had been given to him by Mr. B. This aparently raised a reasonable 
doubt in the Jury's mind and the accused was acquitted. 
Subsequently, Mr. B. was located and he could testify that the accused did 
rob Mr. M. and that he had not given the stolen articles to the accused. A 
charge of perjury was preferred against the accused and he was tried before 
a jury. 
The defence raised the matter of double jeopardy and issue estoppel 
claiming that the accused was tried for a second time on the same facts in 
issue but simply in the guise of a different charge. In other words, the 
issues had been tried and determined in previous Court proceedings and 
trying them again would render the process a farce. The principle is known 
as Res judicata. Whether or not issue estoppel applies because of a vio-
lation of this rule is a question of law and has to be decided by the 
Judge. This reason for judgement is exclusively on this question and 
should be of interest particularly to criminal investigators. 
Issue estoppel, an issue that effectively stops a proceeding, has not been 
heard of too often in criminal cases as it was doubtful if it applied to 
criminal law. In the latter part of 1979 the Supreme Court of Canada 
settled this ambiguity when it ruled unanimously that "issue estoppel is 
part of the criminal law of Canada".* 
*(Gushue v. the Queen) 50 c.c.c. (2d) 417. Supreme Court of Canada December 
1979. 
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R. v. Gordon 
Whether issue estoppel applied in this case and would stop the proceedings 
against the accused for perjury, required the Judge to determine if the 
prerequisite conditions existed: 
1. If one testifies during a trial and is consequently charged with 
perjury, he can only claim double jeopardy (if it is available) if he 
was the one being tried when he testified; 
2. The heart of the dispute between the Crown and the accused was whether 
the accused robbed Mr. M. He testified to the heart of the matter and 
stated under oath that he did not rob Mr. M. In his trial for perjury, 
for the Crown to be successful, the same facts had to be proved as in 
his original trial - that is that the accused did rob Mr. M. . If such 
is the case the accused is doubly jeoparidized in that the same matters 
and facts have to be tried again. This would be an issue that can stop 
the proceedings. (Had the accused testified and allegedly committed 
perjury regarding some peripheral point, rather than the heart of the 
dispute, he could be tried for perjury); and 
3. If the evidence regarding the perjury was fresh and became available to 
the Crown since the original trial, then the accused could be tried for 
the perjury, in spite of the fact that his testimony that is alleged to 
be perjurous was to the heart of the criminal dispute. 
The prerequisites mentioned in 1. and 2. existed, so the remaining question 
was whether the testimony and information that has to prove the accused a 
perjurer in this trial was available to the Crown at the original trial. 
Evidence that was not available during the original trial includes evidence 
that did not exist at that time. For instance the accused may confess sub-
sequent to his trial that he perjured himself. That was not the case 
here. The test to be applied to all other evidence to determine whether or 
not it was available at the original trial _is whether or not "reasonable _ 
diligence was exercised" to secure it and make it available to the Court. 
In this case the witness, Mr. B., could not be served with his subpoena. 
This does not mean that his evidence was not available. When that is the 
case the Crown is, as a matter of right,· entitled to an adjournment. It 
had also been open to the Crown to enter a stay of proceedings when Mr. B 
could . not be found, obtain a warrant for his arrest and seek all other 
appropriate remedies to secure his attendance. Therefore, the law does not 
consider that in a case such as this, the evidence was not available. 
The facts in issue in the robbery trial were the very facts in issue in 
this trial for perjury; the evidence of Mr. B. was available and not 
fresh. The accused was therefore doubly jeopardized and the proceedings 
against him were stopped. 
Accused acquitted. 
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B.. v. Gordon 
The Court recognized the extreme difficulties the Crown may experience when 
an accused testifies and wishes to rebut his evidence. If it cannot 
proceed with perjury subsequently the Crown must call its witnesses to 
counteract the accused's alleged false claims during the same trial. This 
may be extremely difficult where it cannot be anticipated what the 
accused's testimony will be. Particularly when he, in his testimony, lays 
the foundation for a defence of alibi. The Court expressed support for the 
much discussed and suggested rule that an accused is obliged to notify the 
Crown in advance of his trial, when he intends to raise an alibi. 
Many legal minds do disagree with the reasoning in this judgement and argue 
that, in the first trial the dispute was whether the accused committed 
robbery, while in the second the issue was whether he gave false evidence, 
and did thereby mislead the Court. In other words, in the second trial the 
main issue in the first one (the accused's testimony to the heart of the 
dispute, that he did not rob Mr. M.) was only a means by which he committed 
perjury. 
This also appears to be the opinion of the House of Lords*. 
was held that the Crown can only prosecute a person once for 
delict, perjury was seen as an exception to this principle. 
pressed the opinion that a person "is not to be permitted to 
consequences of having testified falsely at his trial". 
Although it 
an alleged 
The Lords ex-
es cape the 
Whether or not this is also the case in Canada, has not been decided by our 
Supreme Court. As will be explained below, our highest Court was deprived 
of making this decision in the Gushue case, supra. 
The accused Gushue and one Mr. Mc.Donald set out to commit a robbery. The 
victim was the proprietor of a taylor shop. The Crown alleged that the 
accused entered the store and shot and killed the victim, while his 
partner, Mc.Donald, stayed outside or simply withdrew from the plan; at 
least that is what Mc.Donald said in his testimony. The accused also 
testified and said that he was the one who withdrew from the criminal 
scheme and that it was Mc.Donald who had entered the store. The accused was 
acquitted at the conclusion of his trial for non-capital murder. 
*Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphreys (1976) 2 All E.R. 497. 
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R. v. Gordon 
Some four years later, while being questioned for other offences, the 
accused told police how he had been resisted by the taylor and that he had 
killed .the man to overcome the resistance. As a consequence the accused 
was charged with robbery and perjury. The Provincial Court Judge refused 
to accept the accused's plea of guilty to perjury and held a preliminary 
inquiry during which the accused testified to have murdered the taylor. 
The Judge was of the opinion that the same issue, whether or not the 
accused murdered the taylor, had to be tried in the perjury case. He ruled 
that due to the acquittal on the murder charge, the issue could not be re-
litigated. 
The Crown persisted and with the consent of a County Court Judge, preferred 
an indictment against the accused for perjury and giving contradictory evi-
dence; the former being based on his testimony during his trial for murder 
and the latter for the contradiction of that evidence and the evidence he 
gave during the preliminary inquiry. On his trial by Judge and jury the 
accused was acquitted of perjury for the same reason as the Provincial 
Court acquitted the accused. However, the accused was convicted of giving 
contradictory evidence. 
Both the Crown and the accused appealed. The Crown disputed the acquittal 
of perjury and the accused his conviction for robbery (to which he pleaded 
guilty) and the conviction of giving contradictory evidence. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal basically left matters as they were, but the 
justices commented that they did not see anything wrong with a conviction 
of perjury in these circumstances and would have ordered a new trial if it 
was not for the conviction of giving contradictory evidence. The Crown did 
not appeal that issue any further but the accused received leave to appeal 
his convictions for robbery and giving contradictory evidence to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. This then meant that not the same issue as in the 
Gordon and Humphrey cases, supra, was before the Supreme Court. 
The accused pleaded that issue estoppel applied in this case. Firstly the 
Court reiterated that issue estoppel is part of the criminal law of Canada, 
and then addressed itself to the question whether it had any application to 
the two convictions of the accused in this case. It was decided that, in 
this case, it was not important whether the testimony was to the heart of 
the issue in the trial or not. The charge was giving contradictory 
evidence in regards to the same occurrence and not perjury. The Supreme 
Court held that it had one thing to consider: "did the Crown make an 
attempt to retry the accused". The Court found that this was not the case, 
therefore issue estoppel was excluded, and held consequently that: 
"~---issue estoppel cannot be founded on false evidence when the 
falsity is disclosed by subsequent evidence not available at the trial 
from which issue estoppel is alleged to arise". 
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R. v. Gordon 
In respect to the acquittal of the accused on the charge of murder and his 
subsequent conviction of armed robbery, the defence argued that this was a 
matter of double jeopardy in this situation. It was made clear during the 
murder trial that the robber and murderer was one and the same person. It 
follows then, that if the accused was not the murderer (he was acquitted) 
he could not be the robber. Therefore, the same issue was tried during his 
robbery trial. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. There are all 
kinds of possibilities which may have led the jury to the accused's acquit-
tal. To say that the jury acquitted the accused because he was not the 
robber is not the "only rational explanation of the verdict of the jury". 
It is therefore conjecture what the issues were for the jury. Not knowing 
this we cannot say if the accused was being tried again on the same issue. 
Robbery is not an included of fence in murder and he was therefore not tried 
for the former offence during his murder trial. 
Note: 
It should be noted that the Gushue case does not negate the findings in the 
Gordon case by the Alberta Queen's Bench. The distinctions between the two 
cases in that in Gordon the charge was perjury in regards to the heart of 
the case. Furthermore.it was alleged that the accused Gordon lied when he 
testified and that Mr. B., the lost witness in the robbery trial, spoke the 
truth when he testified during Gordon's trial for perjury. 
In Gushue, the accused was charged with giving contradictory evidence. The 
testimony came f~om one source both times and it was not necessary to prove 
during which proceedings his evidence was false. 
A case involving "knowingly giving false testimony" was dealt with by the 
B.C. Court of Appeal in Regina v. Moore*. 
Moore was tried in Provincial Court for a driving of fence. He testified 
that he had not been driving at the time of the alleged offence. He 
explained that he was a mere passenger and that his wife had been driving. 
As a result, the. Crown preferred the following three charges against the 
accused: 
l.· per jury for testifying that he did not drive; 
2. perjury for testifying that his wife had been driving and that he 
was a passenger; and 
3. attempting to obstruct justice by "giving false testimony in a 
trial in the Provincial Court of B.C." 
* R. v. Moore [1980) 4 W.W.R. 511 
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K.. v. Gordon 
A jury acquitted the accused on count 1 and 2 but convicted him of count 3. 
Both the Crown and the accused appealed the jury's decision. Only the 
accused's appeal was successful and the B.C. Court of Appeal ordered a new 
trial on count 3A 
Somewhat aside from the topic, when the accused appeared for his new trial an 
argument immediately ensued. Defence counsel claimed that the accused was 
entitled to enter a plea while the Crown was of the opinion that the accused 
was not entitled to enter a plea on a directed new trial and that the Court 
must proceed on the basis of the plea entered at the original trial. The Judge 
presiding at the new trial allowed the accused to enter a plea and he, of 
course, entered the special plea of double jeopardy "autrefois acquit", which 
in essence means "I have been tried for and acquitted on the same facts and 
events and cannot be tried again". Counsel for the accused argued that the 
"same facts and events" had been tried during the perjury trial as all t hree 
counts arose from the same testimony. Needless to say that if the accused had 
been tried originally only for attempting to obstruct justice and was 
acquitted, then, if upon an appeal a new trial was ordered, he could not claim 
double jeopardy. The statutory provision for conducting a directed new trial 
upon appeal, simply supersedes the common law doctrine of double jeopardy. 
This was not the case here. The accused claimed double jeopardy at his new 
trial for attempting to obstruct justice on account of his acquittals on the 
charges of perjury. 
In any event, the judge presiding over the new trial allowed the special plea 
to be entered and held that it was available to the accused. The Crown 
appealed this decision. 
Firstly, the B.C. Court of Appeal, dealing now with this case for the second 
time, held that although an accused is not required to enter a plea at his new 
trial he is not precluded from doing so. The Court reasoned that the accused 
may well wish to plead guilty at his new trial. Surely the Crown would not 
object to that. 
In considering if the accused ' s acquittal of perjury would prevent a subsequent 
trial on attempting to obstruct justice, where both charges arise from the same 
facts and events the Court identified the ingredients to each of these charges 
in this case. 
For perjury the Crown had to prove that the accused: 
1. was a witness at a judicial proceeding; 
2. while such a witness gave false evidence; 
3. knew the evidence he gave was false; and 
4. gave the false evidence with the intent to mislead the Court. 
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For the allegation of attempting to obstruct justice by giving false evi-
dence the Crown had to prove that the accused (1) wilfully attempted to 
obstruct the course of justice by means of (2) giving false testimony in a 
trial in the Proyincial Court of B.C. The B.C. Court of Appeal held in re-
gard to the availability of the plea of autrefois acquit that the issue was 
not necessarily the one claimed by that plea, but issue estoppel, and dealt 
with the alternative claim by the defence that the verdict by the jury was 
inconsistent. In view of the identical ingredients to be proved in the 
charges of perjury and that of attempting to obstruct justice it {the jury) 
was not entitled to find the accused innocent of perjury and guilty of 
attempting to obstruct justice by giving testimony that he knew to be 
false. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the submission and observed that by vir-
tue of Section 123C.C. perjury must be "corroborated in a material 
particular by evidence that implicates the accused", which is not a pre-
requisite to find guilt of obstructing justice. 
In other words, the jury may well have found that there was no corrobora-
tion and was therefore precluded to return a verdict of guilty on the 
perjury charge. This meant that the verdicts of not guilty of perjury but 
guilty of obstructing justice were not inconsistent. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
Discharge on plea of autref ois acquit set aside 
New trial to be conducted 
Written by John M. Post 
March 1981 
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CRIMINAL CHARGES AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 
ARISING FROM THE SAME FACTS 
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA 
Ke Hartley and Fry et al Spearns v. Fry et al 102 D.L.R. (3d) 
Martin v. Attorney General of Nova Scotia 110 D.L.R. (3d) 
In both cases police officers were charged under the Criminal Code with common 
assault as well as "discreditable conduct" contrary to the Code of Discipline 
which is part of the regulations pursuant to the Nova Scotia Police Act. In 
each case the criminal charges and the disciplinary actions arose from the same 
facts and circumstances. 
In the Hartley and Fry case the criminal and disciplinary charges were preferred 
simultaneously and the disciplinary hearing was commenced prior to the officers' 
trial in Provincial Court. Hartley and Fry petitioned the Supreme Court for an 
order prohibiting the disciplinary proceedings against them. 
In Martin v Attorney General the constable was acquitted of the criminal charge 
and subsequently accused of the discipline offence. He admitted - the 
discreditable conduct and was fined 8 days pay. After this, Cst. Martin sought 
ancillary relief.from the Supreme Court in respect to the disciplinary action to 
which he had been subjected. 
The officers based their arguments on the fact that the Code of Discipline 
stipulates that where a police officer has been acquitted or convicted of an 
offence no disciplinary action shall be taken against him arising from the same 
facts and circumstances. Practically in the same breath,however, the ~~ 
Regulations state that this provision does not apply where the disciplinary 
proceedings relate to "separate and distinct issues". (Note that it does not say 
separate and distinct facts and circumstances) 
In both cases the officers failed to persuade the Supreme Court that the 
disciplinary actions against them were illegal. The Justice who decided the 
Martin case agreed with his "brother" who presided over the Hartley and Fry 
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. 
dispute. That portion of the reason for judgement in the Hartley and Fry case 
that goes to the heart of the issue, reads as follows: 
"It is my opinion that if the constables are acquitted of 
the criminal charges, they would nevertheless be subject to 
disciplinary procedures on charges under s. l(a) of the 
Code of discipline as the disciplinary hearing relates to a 
separate and distinct issue from that tried in the criminal 
proceedings, the issue in the criminal proceeding being 
whether the constables committed an assault under the 
Criminal Code, while the issue in the discipline 
proceedings being whether the constables contravened the 
Code of Discipline by acting in a manner that was 
reasonably likely to bring discredit upon the reputation of 
the Halifax Police Force". 
Written by John M. Post 
March 1981 
Regina v. Colet December 29 1980 
Supreme Court of Canada 
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"The house of every one. is to him as his 
castle and fortress, as well for his defence 
against injury and violence, as for his repose 
••••••• "* 
This famous dictum dating back to 1604 was cited by the Supreme Court of Canada 
on December 2nd, 1980 in its reason for judgement in Colet v the Queen. Mr. 
Colet was charged with two counts of attempted murder and two counts of 
intending to cause bodily harm. His intended victims were police officers. 
Mr. Colet lived in "rudimentary shelter" and the municipality decided to take 
down his home and clean up the property. The accused made it known that he 
would protect his humble abode and it was apparently common knowledge that he 
to that end had armed himself with firearms and explosives. 
To ensure safety for the Public Works personnel to carry out council's orders, 
police obtained a warrant pursuant to section 105(1)C.C., which authorized the 
seizure of all firearms and explosives from the accused. As neither the 
wording of the section nor that of the warrant included the power to search, 
police sought legal advice. Seemingly the experts were of the opinion that 
authorization to seize includes power to search. 
When police arrived at the accused's home it was evident that he disagreed with 
the legal experts. Even waving the warrant, accompanied by a shouted message 
that this was an authorization by the Supreme Court to search his home, did not 
deter him from defending his property from the roof of his home. Luckily no 
one was hurt. 
The accused, who was acquitted by a jury, was ordered to stand trial again by 
the B. C. Court of Appeal. He appealed the Court of Appeal decision to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
The issue to be decided was whether the police officers were trespassers when 
they attempted to search the accused's home. To do this the Court had to first 
determine if authority to seize includes power to search. 
The Crown's position in support of such a finding was that the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 1975 had decided in Eccles v. Bourque** that entering and searching a 
home Qn the strength of reasonable and probable grounds that the person for 
whom police had a warrant was in the home, was a situation where personal 
rights had to yield to public interest. 
* 1604 7 E.R. 194 5 Co. Rep. 91a 
** (1975) 2 s.c.R. 739 
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The Supreme Court of Canada had added: 
" ••••• The criminal is not immune from arrest in his own 
in the home of one of his friends ••••••••••••••••••••• 
will be seen that the broad basic principle of sanctity 
home is subject to the exception that upon proper demand 
officials of the King may break down doors to arrest". 
home nor 
Thus it 
of the 
the 
In addition the Crown drew the Court's attention to section 26(2) of the 
Federal Interpretation Act, which states: 
"Where power is given to a person, officer or 
functionary, to do or enforce the doing of any act 
or thing, all such powers shall be deemed to be 
also given as are necessary to enable the person, 
officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing 
of the act or thing". 
In their reason for judgement the Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada made 
it clear that they were not reversing their views as they expressed them in 
Eccles v. Bourque. However, they found that the precedent did not afford 
authority for the proposition that public interest is paramount and the rights 
of the individual secondary. All sections in the Criminal Code were enacted in 
the public interest. This does not mean that therefore the rights of 
individuals can be violated in furtherance of the enforcement of criminal law, 
unless there are specific provisions to do so. In Eccles v.Bourque the Court's 
remarks were limited to incidents of entering a home against the tenant's will 
to _search for a "fugitive from justice". 
The Court reviewed nearly all provisions in law authorizing the seizure of 
property and found that in all eases a separate provision to search is made. 
It therefore rejected the suggestion that the Interpretation Act creates a dual 
authority from s. 105 C.C., that is to "seize" and to "search". Said the 
Supreme Court of Canada: 
"••••••••if Parliament intended to include the 
power "to search" in the provisions of s. 105(1), 
the failure to do so was a clear case of 
legislative oversight, but that power which has 
not been expressly conferred cannot be supplied by 
invoking the provisions of the Interpretation 
Act". 
As a consequence the officers were trespassers. 
Acquittals were restored. 
Written by John M. Post 
March 1981 
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STATEMENTS 
Regina v. Coons 51 c.c.c. (2d) 388 1980 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
Usually the objective of the Crown in adducing a statement made by the 
accused is to thereby prove the truth of its content. It is because of the 
possible acceptance of the statement as evidence of facts that the Courts 
have insisted on voluntariness on the part of the accused as a prerequisite 
to its admissibility in evidence. Statements extracted by coersion of 
some kind cannot be relied upon to be true. 
It has happened, however, that statements made by a suspect, which were 
later ruled inadmissible in evidence, led investigators to the scene of a 
crime or the location of items related to the crime (known as subsequent 
facts). The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated in 1970* that where, by 
virtue of an inadmissible statement by an accused, facts are discovered 
those facts and those portions of that statement directly and strictly 
related to those facts must be admitted in evidence. This, of course, as 
the statement is-then no longer the exclusive proof of its content. The 
discovery of the fact confirms the truth of the content of part of the 
confession that relates to that fact. In the Wray case, for instance, the 
confession was ruled inadmissible but that portion of it that led 
investigators to a rifle which Wray claimed to be, and which by a ballistic 
test proved to be the murder weapon, was admitted in evidence. 
In this Coons case, the accused was convicted of the murder of a young 
woman, whose mutilated body was found behind a school building. The body 
had been found before the police questioned the accused. The accused did 
take police to the murder scene. The "walk" to the location was part of a 
confession by the accused that he had murdered the woman. The confession 
had been preceded by an inducement, and consequently the trial judge ruled 
it inadmissible in evidence. The Crown had submitted that, as in R. v. 
Wray, the "walk" and that portion of the confession related to it should be 
admitted in evidence. The trial judge had disagreed and held that this 
case was distinct from Wray and other similar cases** in that the scene, 
and the body was discovered by police without any assistance from the 
accused, and certainly not as a result of anything said to them. Crown 
counsel had argued that whatever the accused said during ."the walk" was a 
part of the inadmissible confession that ought to be admitted in evidence 
as it proved the accused's knowledge of the location of the scene and the 
position of the body. In other words, it confirmed the truth of what the 
accused said and it was therefore safe to accept as a fact "that the 
accused was with the girl at the very place where her body was found". 
* Regina v. Wray (1970) 4 c.c.c. 1) 
** R. v. St. Lawrence [1949] 7 C.R. 464 and R. v. Hoase [1965] 2 c.c.c. 5 
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The trial judge ruled that the same could be accomplished by allowing in 
evidence all of the actions and gestures by the accused when he led police 
to the known scene, rather than what he said. 
Before the B. C. Court of Appeal the defence argued that one's statements 
and gestures are inseparable. As an example a nod by the accused was 
allowed in evidence, a gesture which is the equivalent to a verbal "yes". 
As interesting as these arguments are, the Court of Appeal held that the 
actions and gestures should not have been admitted in evidence. The Wray 
case "has restricted the application of the principle to evidence of 
subsequent facts and so much of the confession as strictly relates to 
them". 
Conviction set aside. 
Written by John M. Post 
March 1981 
New t~ial ordered. 
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Admissibility of Private Communication 
Undercover Agent in Cell Block 
Regina v. Grant, Biggins and Sharma 
County Court, Vancouver, B. c. 
48 c.c.c. (2d) 504 
A police officer assumed the role of a person charged with an offence and 
was placed in the lock-up with the accused. The officer, in his testimony 
at the trial of the accused, related conversation he overheard between the 
accused and others and direct conversation he had with the accused. 
Defence counsel objected, submitting that all the conversations adduced in 
evidence were intercepted private communication for which no authorization 
was obtained. 
In regards to the overheard conversations, it was argued that the 
definition of intercept "includes listen to". (s. 178.1 C.C. ). Respecting 
the direct conversation between that officer and the accused the defence 
encouraged the Court to hold that an "intended receiver" is the person who 
the originator of private communication intended to receive it. In this 
case the accused intended a person who was charged with an offence to 
receive his communication but not a police officer. The pretence by the 
police officer therefore did amount to an interception, defence counsel 
argued. 
The Court rejected both arguments. The conversations between the accused 
and other prisoners as well as that between the accused and the undercover 
officer were "not contaminated with an electromagnetic, acoustic, 
mechanical or other device". 
Furthermore, in relation to the direct conversation between the accused and 
the officer, the Court held that there was no interception in spite of the 
fac~ that "the originator did not appreciate who the receiver truly was". 
Written by John M. Post 
March 1981 
Communications admitted in 
evidence. 
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RECENT COMPLAINT 
Regina v. Kulak 46 c.c.C.(ed) 30 <ntario Court of Appeal 
The accused visi~ed the apartment of a friend who had too much to drink to 
drive his fiancee home. The accused offered to drop the girl off at her 
place of residence on his way home and left with her at 3:00 A. M. Instead 
of driving her home he drove out of town on a highway. While driving at 
high speed, he ordered the girl to undress and commit various indecent 
acts. Whenever the girl hesitated he swerved to frighten her. 
Finally the accused stopped at a remote area and after an unsuccessful 
attempt of sexual intercourse, he forced her to commit an act of fellatio 
(oral sex). During this the girl found a hammer on the floor of the car, 
and with the intent to kill him, she struck the accused on the head. The 
blow did not more than momentarily stun the accused. After another attempt 
of sexual intercourse he dropped the girl off at her home at 12:30 P. M. 
The accused denied all allegations of involvement with the girl, other than 
driving her directly home from his friend's place and adduced evidence of a 
normal working day and being home with his wife. 
The jury obviously did not believe the accused as they returned verdicts of 
guilty to charges of kidnapping, unlawful confinement and indecent assault. 
The accused appealed these convictions and the most interesting ground of 
appeal was the trial judge's decision to admit in evidence two separate 
statements made by the complainant (the girl) to her room-mate and a priest 
under the exemption to the hearsay rule commonly referred to as "recent 
complaint". 
When the complainant had arrived home after her alleged ordeal, her 
room-mate was home. She had noticed that the complainant was very upset 
and had asked to tell her what was wrong. At first the answer was that 
she could not tell anybody and that if she told "he" would kill her. The 
room-mate then asked: . "Have you been raped?" and the complainant had 
replied: "Yes, I have". After this the complainant had told all to her 
room-mate. 
After this the complainant had a sleep and then went for a walk, ending up 
in a church where she prayed. An elderly woman had noticed how upset she 
was and had advised the complainant to see the priest. She had told the 
priest the whole story and said to have a real feeling of guilt to have 
tried to kill a man. 
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The Crown had adduced the statements made to the room-mate and the priest to be 
admitted in evidence under the above mentioned exemption to the hearsay rule. 
Some of the basic prerequisites to admissibility in evidence of "recent 
complaints" are: 
1. the complaint must be made by the victim at a first and reasonable 
opportunity to do so; 
2. the complaint must be voluntary in that it must not be extracted from the 
victim by probing or suggestive questions; 
3. the complaint must relate to a crime which is emotionally so stressful that 
it may cause hysteria on the part of the victim, etc. 
However, the rules are not stringent and particularly in relation to the 
voluntariness of the complaint a lot must be left to the discretion of the 
trial judge. 
For instance, the relationship between the complainant and the confidant is 
important. A mother's probing, leading, suggestive and/or pressing questions 
may well render the first complaint inadmissible, while concerned questioning 
by a peer may not affect the voluntariness of the response. One of the most 
basic tests to determine if a first complaint may be admissible in evidence, is 
the question "If it was not for the questioning would there have been a 
statement?" If the answer is "no" the statement's admissibility may well be in 
jeopardy. 
The trial judge in this case ruled that the complainant's answer to her 
room-mate's question: "Have you been raped?" was inadmissible. However, the 
statement the complainant made to the priest had been admitted in evidence. It 
was reasoned that a complaint must be made, not at the first opportunity, but 
the first reasonable opportunity. In regards to the statement to the priest 
being the second and not the first complaint, the trial Court held that there 
was a reasonable sequence to consider the statement to the room-mate and the 
priest a simple continuous complaint. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge. Firstly, the question by 
the room-mate was not considered to be capable to preclude the complainant's 
response from the admissible evidence. The relationship between the room-mate 
and the complainant was not such that the question would put words in the mouth 
of the complainant or in any way compel or induce her to complain. Said the 
Court of Appeal: 
"Mere persuasion to account for an upset state does not 
render a statement made as a result of such persuasion 
i nadmissible as a recent complaint." 
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In regards to the statement to the priest the Court of Appeal made it clear 
that where two statements are made by a complainant and the first one is ruled 
inadmissible, that does not give the second complaint the status of 
a first complaint for the purpose of this exemption to the hearsay rule. 
There may be situations where there is a sequence of statements which can be 
considered a continuation of the first complaint. In such a circumstance the 
statements are not separate and distinct and may be admitted as one complaint 
although made at different times, locations and to different persons. 
In this case, the Court held that the complaint to the room-mate and the priest 
were separate and distinct from one another. 
The Court commented that if the statement to the room-mate had not been made, 
the complaint to the priest could have been considered for admissibility. 
Accused's Appeal Allowed 
New trial ordered. 
Notes: This exemption to the hearsay rule is usually seen as something that 
favours the Crown only. It is often believed that the evidentiary value of a 
recent complaint is similar to that of an admission or a confession by an 
accused. These are actually misconceptions. 
The history of the rule seems to indicate that it was introduced by the defence 
side of the criminal dispute. It was reasoned that a person who had been the 
victim of a crime such as related to sexual abuses, would complain of the crime 
at the first reasonable opportunity. 
If the victim did not raise a "hue and cry" about it, while the opportunity was 
there, then possibly her testimony could not be believed. The absence of a 
.. hue and cry" is a presumption against the complainant. 
The recent complaint therefore is adduced and admitted to show consistency 
between the first and spontaneous complaint and the complainant's testimony, 
rather than to prove the truth of its content. 
It is also viewed and referred to as corroborative evidence. This, of course, 
it is not. Corroborative evidence is evidence from an independent source, 
which does not only show that a crime was committed but is also inclined to 
show it was committed by the accused. Firstly, the recent complaint and the 
testimony came from the same source, the complainant, in spite of the fact that 
it is given by the recipient of the complaint. Secondly such a complaint does 
not necessarily have to show that the crime was committed by the accused. 
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The words "first reasonable opportunity" have received a fairly clear interpre-
tation. Reasonable does not only refer to time but also relates to the person 
complained to. For instance a young girl may feel inhibited to complain to a 
strange man. In this regard, each situation has to be weighed on its own 
merits and all circumstances must be considered, such as the personality and 
character of the victim and the relationship or lack of it, with the persons to 
whom the complaint could have been lodged earlier. It could be said that the 
receiver of the complaint should be a sort of a confidant. Needless to say 
that a complainant can be selective in this regard and may forego opportunities 
to complain until she finds someone she can confide in. The word "reasonable" 
refers to the time lapse, the opportunities and the personalities. 
It is not inconceivable that a victim Will complain to a person unknown. This 
does not mean that the complaint cannot be adduced in evidence. Although it 
will no doubt lessen the weight of the evidence, the complainant may testify of 
the complaint. Conversely, if the complainant does not testify of her 
complaint the recipient of it cannot give it in evidence. 
In most cases the complainants are women and children when they have been the 
victims of sexual abuses. The Courts have usually admitted the complaint if it 
was prompted by fear or hysteria on account of physical abuse. For a man to so 
react was inconsistent with his role and image. However, in 1966 a recent 
complaint by a 23 year old man was ruled admissible by the B. C. Court of 
Appeal.* He had been the victim of a sexual assault. 
This leaves the obvious question about the admissibility of recent complaints 
in regard to alleged crimes other than sex offences. Also in this the B. c. 
Courts made history. Guided by Regina v. Hurst and Miller, a B. c. County 
Court Judge ruled in a case of unlawful confinement of a sixteen year old girl, 
that a recent complaint is admissible in evidence if the acts of the accused 
cause fear or hysteria on account of abuse.** 
In this case, Regina v. Kulak, the Court held that the complaints to the room-
mate and the priest were separate and distinct. The case usually referred to 
when continuous first complaints are adduced, is Regina v. Volk.*** Volk was 
charged with gross indecency as a result of an act of fellatio. The girl 
hitched a ride on the highway immediately after the act and complained to the 
motorist who gave her a ride and drove her to an R.C.M.P. Detachment some 
distance away. The complaint to the motorist as well as the complaint to the 
police officer was admitted in evidence as a continuous first complaint. 
* Regina v. Hurst and Miller 1966 3 c.c.c. 399 
** Regina v. Frome 31 c.c.c. (2d) 332 
*** Regina v. Volk 6 w.w.R. 29 1973 
Written by John M. Post 
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HEARSAY-CONTINUITY-RECORDS 
Regina v. I.AL s1·c.c.c. (2d) 336 
British Columbia Court of .Appeal 
The accused, along with others, was arrested and booked in a holding unit 
at a police station. 
A day previous to the arrest, a house was broken into and approximately 
$4,000.00 worth of jewelry and cash was taken. The arrest of the accused 
was unrelated to the break-in. 
The investigation of the break-in led to the accused and his companions as 
one of them had lived at the home that was burglarized and knew where the 
valuables were kept. The accused and two others were charged and convicted 
of the breaking into the home. The accused appealed his conviction. 
During the investigation a police officer had attended at the lock-up and 
requested access to the property taken from the accused by the booking 
officer. The envelope which contained the accused's property was found by 
comparing the number opposite the accused's name on the booking sheet with 
a corresponding number on an envelope. The envelope which bore the 
accused's name contained two new five dollar bills, the serial numbers of 
which were in sequence with similar bills in the teller's drawer, from 
which the victim of the break-in had received a sum of money just previous 
to the burglary. 
During the accused's trial two of his companions testified. The one said 
that the accused was involved in and present during the break-in and the 
other said that the accused was not involved. 
The trial judge held that the evidence of the accomplice who testified to 
the accused's involvement had been corroboratd by the evidence of the five 
dollar bills in the accused's possession. The finding that he was in 
possession of the bills is what the accused disputed. 
The Crown had adduced the evidence of the money, by only calling the 
investigating officer. He had testified to have worked in the jail ten 
years ago and said about the procedure in respect of prisoners' property: 
"It has probably varied some since then". 
The accused claimed that the evidence of his possession of the five dollar 
bills was hearsay and inadmissible. 
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The B. C. Court of Appeal agreed with the accused and held that at best the 
investigator's evidence had proved that the bills were in the same building as 
the accused, and concluded: 
.. The chain from the offence to the bills is complete but the continuity 
breaks down and does not continue to the appelant so as to link him to the 
offence ... 
The appeal was allowed and the accused acquitted. 
Explanatory comments on the issue: 
Generally, things conceived by one's own senses and personal acts may be 
attested to and are usually admissible in evidence. Where the reliabili~y of 
those senses and personal credibility permits, our attestations may be proof of 
facts. One major means by which this reliability and credibility is tested is 
cross-examination. Needless to point out that cross-examination of a witness 
who cannot vouch that matters testified to are facts, would be an exercise in 
futility. Where a witness cannot vouch for the truth of those things testified 
to, the evidence is usually hearsay. 
Unless there is an exception (there are more than thirty of them) the hearsay 
rule prohibits the admission of such evidence. In this case possession of the 
bills would link the accused to the of fence he was charged with. The 
investigating officer's evidence in regards to his findings in the records of 
the jail was intended to result in a judicial inference that the accused did 
possess the money. This while the officer candidly conceded not to be too 
familiar with the procedures in the jail. He could not vouch for the fact that 
the bills were taken from the accused or even assure the Court that there were 
procedural safeguards that the property of prisoners did not get mixed up. The 
officer who booked the accused is the only one who may have been able to do 
so. His evidence would not be hearsay, capable of admission and could lead to 
the finding that the accused was in fact in possession of the five dollar 
bills. 
The Court of Appeal suggested that if the Crown had presented in evidence the 
envelope in which the five dollar bills were found with a notation by the 
booking officer made at the time of the· booking to say for instance: "I found 
the contents of this envelope on the person of (name of the accused) upon 
booking him on the (date of booking) "the envelope could be admitted to prove 
the truth of that statement. 
At least it would have helped the Court to draw the inference the Crown 
suggested it could. In essence, the Crown suggested that the Court accept the 
jail's filing system without giving the defence any opportunity to scrutinize 
that system for its reliability and accuracy. Although the Canada Evidence Act 
provides some exceptions to the hearsay rule allowing facts to be proved by 
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means of records, the Court here had no opportunity to rule if the jail 
records would be admissible as none were presented. 
If the Crown had called the booking officer, and he could not specifically 
remember booking the accused or what he found on him, then it may be ex-
pected that the rule regarding "recorded recollections of recent events" 
would apply. lb.ere are many things we routinely do in life. If it was not 
for records and diaries we could not attest to them. Yet notations may not 
bring back memories or details. lb.e rule referred to, was established or 
at least confirmed in England in the early part of this century. A tram-
line was sued for injuries sustained by a passenger in a run-a~way tram 
car,the brakes of which failed while descending a slope. To rebut the 
allegation of negligence the company called their car inspector who had 
checked the tram car for safety, a short time before the accident. The man 
who checked a number of cars each day could not remember this specific 
inspection, but produced the inspection ·report which he used on the occa-
sion of inspecting the car in question. He testified how he systematically 
works his way down the checklist on his inspections and would never tick 
anything off as safe unless it met the set standards. In other words the 
witness could vouch for the accuracy of the notations as he made them 
truthfully and at a time that he remembered the details. The Court held 
that such testimony rendered the notation proof of the truth of its con-
tent. 
We may expect that the same would have applied if the booking officer had 
testified, provided, of course, that the Court found that the procedures 
followed made the record reliable. 
Written by John M. Post 
March 1981 
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CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
:Regina v. P. G. Marketplace and Mcintosh. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal. 
51 c.c.c. (2d) 185 
Mrs. B. went to the accused company and agreed to consign her car to the 
company which agreed to pay Mrs. B. a minimum of $4,300.00. The contract 
called for any funds received for the car over and above that amount to go 
to the company. Mr. M., a salesman and employee of the company, drew up 
the contract which was signed by a company director. The car was sold and 
when Mrs. B. came for her money she was told by Mr. M. that due to 
trade-ins and other disappointments the company could not give her more 
than $3,600.00. Bargaining brought this amount up to $3,700.00. The same 
director who approved the contract signed the cheque to Mrs. B. who 
subsequently discovered that the car had been sold for $4,800.00. The 
company was convicted of fraud and appealed the conviction. 
The company did not deny any of the facts or that the transaction did not 
amount to fraud. It simply claimed that it was not criminally liable for 
acts committed by employees. 
In 1969 the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled on the same issue* and did create 
a precedent which has been quoted and followed by many Canadian Courts. To 
the question put by the accused company the B. C. Court of Appeal quoted 
and agreed with the precedent which states: 
" ••• if an agent falls within a category which entitles 
the Court to hold that he is a vital organ of the body 
the sphere of duty and responsibility assigned to him 
so that his action and intent are the very action and 
intent render the company indictable by reason 
thereof." 
Two things persuaded the B. C. Court of Appeal that Mr. M. was such an 
agent. Mrs. B. had exclusively dealt with Mr. M. who received proforma 
approval for the transactions from a seni.or official of the company. 
Secondly, the primary benefit of the fraud was to the company with only a 
secondary benefit to Mr. M. in the form of commission. 
Conviction upheld. 
* R. v. St. Lawrence Corp. Ltd. et al [1969] 3 c.c.c. 263 
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CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS 
Regina v Reburn 55 c.c.c. (2d) 419 
Alberta Court of Appeal Septeaber 1980 
A police officer at a complaint desk received a telephone call from a man who 
claimed to be at the home to which an ambulance and police were on the way to 
attend a reported stabbing. 
The caller confessed to be responsible for the stabbing. The police who in the 
meantime had arrived at the scene were made aware of the confession. The 
caller was instructed to leave via the front door and surrender to the officers 
at the scene who arrested the accused in accordance to and consistent with 
these arrangements. 
The accused was acquitted of second degree murder. The Crown had declined to 
adduce any further evidence when the trial judge at the conclusion of a voir 
dire ruled the confession inadmissible as he was not satisfied beyond a ~~ 
reasonable doubt that it was the accused who made the confession. The judge 
had rejected to rule on the voluntariness of the confession, claiming that 
proof of the accused having made the statement is prerequisite to the issue of 
voluntariness. 
The objective of presenting a statement by an accused in evidence, is to prove 
the truth of its content. Whether a statement is admissible in evidence is a 
point of law and the responsibility of the judiciary; whether the content of 
the statement can be accepted as fact is a point of fact, and the function of 
the jury. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had been wrong. Upon 
examination of precedents on this issue the Court held that where a statement 
by the accused is adduced in evidence the trial judge must conduct a voir dire 
solely for the purpose of determining if the statement was made voluntarily. 
If the statement is found to have been given voluntarily, then if there is some 
evidence to be considered by the jury, it must be admitted in evidence. 
The judge of the facts (jury or judge when he sits alone) determines whether 
the accused made the statement, if it is true or what weight it can be given. 
In other words whether the statement is evidence is a point of law, its 
evidentiary value is a point of fact. The statement should have been admitted 
if found to have been given voluntarily; whether the accused made it and if its 
content should be relied upon must be considered at the conclusion of the trial 
when deciding on the verdict. 
A new trial was ordered. 
Written by John M. Post 
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Can a Peace Officer by his method of investigation become an accomplice in 
the commission of the crime? 
The defence of entrapment. 
Regina v. Ridge 51 c.c.c. (2d) 261 
British Colum.bia Court of Appeal 
The accused and one W. were associates in trafficking MDA. Police officers 
investigating this conspiracy availed themselves of the services of one B. 
He became involved in the conspiracy and purchased quantities of MDA from 
w. which were delivered by the accused. Police provided B. with the funds 
to make the purchases. He in turn supplied police with samples for the 
purpose of analysis of each shipment, and was allowed to keep the remainder 
and traffic it for his own benefit. 
At the conclusion of his trial, at which B. and the officer who liaised 
with him testified, the accused was convicted of conspiracy and several 
counts of trafficking. He appealed these convictions claiming among other 
things that: 
1. the jury had not been adequately instructed on the definition of 
accomplice; 
2. the police officer's evidence required corroboration as he was an 
accomplice; and 
3. the method of gathering evidence against him amounted to entrapment 
and consequently the Court proceedings leading to his convictions were 
an abuse of the process of the Court which should have resulted in a 
judicial stay of proceedings. 
The trial judge had explained to the jury that an accomplice is a 
"participes criminis", (an accomplice). He had given an example but failed 
to explain the content of section 21, C. c. (parties to an offence). 
The Court of Appeal found that the instructions must have been 
incomprehensible to a group of lay people and were therefore insufficient. 
There was no doubt that B. was an accomplice, but the trial judge had 
instructed that "it can be argued with great force" that the officer was an 
accom~lice also. 
It is well established in law that the evidence of an accomplice must be 
corroborated to be accepted as proof of claimed facts. Corroborative 
evidence must originate from an independent source which confirms the truth 
of the accomplice's testimony. Furthermore, an accomplice cannot 
corroborate the evidence of another accomplice. 
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Regina v. Ridge 
The Crown had contended that the evidence of the officer had corroborated 
the evidence of B.. Defence counsel's position was, of course, that the 
officer's evidence required corroboration also if the Jury found that he 
was indeed an accomplice. If so, the evidence of both witnesses remained 
uncorroborated. 
The Crown reminded the Court of the precedent* that a police officer who 
participates in an offence for the purpose of collecting evidence cannot be 
a true accomplice. This as the officer does not have the "mixed motives" a 
true accomplice may have which tends to render his testimony unreliable. 
An obvious motive is that the true accomplice may expect to be treated ioore 
leniently if his evidence supports the Crown. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal agreed that the precedent applied in this case. 
Therefore the officer's evidence required no corroboration, was separate 
from B's testimony and sufficient to support the convictions of 
trafficking. In regards to the charge of conspiracy the conviction 
resulted mainly from the uncorroborated evidence given by B. and not from 
testimony by the officer. A new trial on the conspiracy charge was ordered 
therefore. 
Entrapment 
When evidence against an accused has been gathered by "calculated 
inveigling or persistent importuning"** and particularly where the accused 
would not have committed the offence had it not been for these questionable 
methods, the issue of entrapment may arise. 
It is very questionable if the defence of entrapment is available in 
Canada. When it was found that an accused had been entrapped the Canadian 
Judiciary could remedy the situation by invoking a judicial stay of 
proceedings. This as such surreptitious methods justified Judges to 
exercise what was believed their inherent jurisdiction and duty to prevent 
the abuse of the process of their Courts. 
In view of a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1977*** it is not 
clear if Judges still have this remedy available to them. In the light of 
this the Court of Appeal held that "it was not persuaded" that the trial 
Judge could have given the Jury the option to find that the process of the 
Court was abused. 
* Sneddon v. Stevenson [1967] 2 All E.R. 1277 
** Regina v. Ormerod [1969] 4 C.C.C. 3 Supreme Court of Canada 
*** Rourke v. The Queen 35 C.C. C. (2d) 129. 
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Regina v. Ridge 
As interesting as these matters may be, the Court of Appeal did not have to 
decide on these issues. It held that if there was entrapment in this case, w. 
rather than the accused was the victim. The defence had claimed that the 
accused had been entrapped "vicariously" as W. was his agent. The Appeal Court 
responded that the evidence revealed that W. had persuaded the accused to enter 
into the arrangement rather than the other way around. Therefore, W. was not 
the accused_' s agent and vicarious entrapment did not apply. 
All this resulted in dismissal of the accused's appeal against his convictions 
of trafficking. 
The apparent improper arrangement which allowed B. ·to traffic profitably in 
drugs purchased with tax dollars, did not receive the rebuke from the Courts one 
may have expected. The Crown stressed that the drugs provided to B. had to be 
made available on the market. They were of such quantity that the lack of 
supply would have been noticed immediately, aroused suspicion and have 
jeopardized the gathering of evidence against the principals in this drug 
trafficking operation. 
Shortly after handing down the decision in the Ridge case, three Justices of the 
B. c. Court of Appeal had to decide in Regina v. Amato* if in that case 
entrapment was a defence. Amato was persuaded by his employer to obtain some 
cocaine for a third party. The accused complied reluctantly. Shortly after the 
accused was approached by a police informer to purchase cocaine for him. Again 
the accused expressed not to be interested and only procured the narcotic on 
persistent persuasion. The third time the accused was approached by the informer 
and an undercover policeman.- This time the accused's reluctance was overcome by 
threats that force would be used by their clients if he would not perform. 
The accused was charged with trafficking for the second and third transaction. 
At his trial in Provincial Court he had raised the defence of entrapment and had 
drawn the attention of that Court to the definition of entrapment by the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada in minority and dissenting judgement:** 
"The problem which has caused judicial concern is the one which arises 
from the police instigated crime, where the police have gone beyond mere 
solicitation or mere decoy work and have actively organized a scheme of 
ensnarement, of entrapment, in order to prosecute the person so caught. 
In my opinion, it is only in that situation that it is proper to speak of 
entrapment and to consider what effect this should have on the 
prosecution of a person who has thus been drawn into the commission of an 
offence." 
* 51 c.c.c. (2d) 401 
** Regina v. Kirzner (1977) 38 c.c.c. (2d) 131 
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The trial judge had added that before one can speak of entrapment, it must 
be shown that had it not been for the instigation and ensnarement the 
accused would not have been involved in the crime. However, the trial 
judge had concluded that the evidence only supported the finding of 
"persistent solicitation .. on the part of the informer and the police. The 
accused was convicted and appealed this decision. 
The B. c. Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the accused was 
not entrapped. They expressed the opinion that whether entrapment is 
available as a defence should be decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, or 
when the matter arises in B. c •• by their Court when "it is composed of 
five members who can deal definitively with the problem ... 
Appeal by accused dismissed 
Convictions upheld 
Comment: Although this is strictly a prediction, a precedent by one of our 
Courts of superior jurisdiction, that entrapment is available as a defence 
seems inevitable. That is if the comments in passing by Justices and the 
tenor of the up-until-now dissenting judgements on this issue are any 
indication. 
Some judges of the B. C. Provincial Court, in the absence of what they 
consider a binding decision, have already accepted entrapment as a defence. 
One example of this is Regina v. Haukness [1976] 5 W.W.R. 420. 
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MAKING A DEAL! 
"You plead guilty and consent to admissibility of intercepted 
communication and we will not ask for a jail sentence". 
Question: Does the "deal" and consent after the interception affect 
admissibility of the communication in evidence? 
Rosen v. 'Die Queen 51 c.c.c. (2d) 65 
Supreme Court of Canada 
The accused and a number of other persons were charged with conspiracy to 
defraud the public by means of some manipulation of the stock market. 
Essential evidence was the private communications between the accused and 
his co-conspirators. Three of the co-conspirators went with their lawyers 
to police a few days prior to the trial and made a deal. They promised to 
plead guilty and testify to consent to the admissibility in evidence of all 
the intercepted communications to which they had been a party. The 
reciprocal part of the bargain was that the Crown would not seek a jail 
sentence. Everybody lived up to the agreement and the three were put on 
probation. 
During the accused's trial the three co-conspirators testified as promised 
but conceded in cross-examination that they did so to live up to the terms 
of the bargain which they solely agreed to out of fear of going to jail. 
The accused who was convicted appealed arguing that the intercepted 
communication was inadmissible in evidence because: 
(a) consent to admissibility was given after the interception; 
(b) that such consent was intended by Parliament to be admissible only 
against the consenter and not against anyone else; and 
(c) that such consent must be given freely and voluntarily, without a 
promise or threat. 
In regards to the consent having to be given prior to the interception, the 
Supreme Court held that this is only the case where there is no authoriza-
tion to intercept a private communication (178.11 (2)(a) C.C.). The 
consent to admission of an intercepted private communication can be given 
any time, and by virtue of the law of evidence, section 178.16 (l)(b) c.c. 
was designed for consent given after the interception. If it was given 
before, the interception would be lawful even without an authorization and 
the communication would be admissible in most circumstances. 
- 37 -
Rosen v. 'lhe Queen 
In regards to the second cause for appeal the defence raised an interesting 
argument. Historically the matter of admissibility of evidence against a 
person is a question of law to be decided by the judiciary. In this case, 
no law or judicial discretion is involved. The important question of 
admissibility of this damaging evidence against the accused was "upon the 
whim of a co-accused". Therefore, Parliament must have meant that a person 
may consent to damaging evidence to be admitted against himself only (after 
all a person may plead guilty if he wishes) but not against another person, 
said defence counsel. 
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed and held that section 178.1& (1) 
c.c. is unambiguous and needs no clarification. If Parliament had intended 
the consenter and the person against whom the evidence is admissible to be 
one and the same, it would have clearly said no. 
Does the consent to admission in evidence of intercepted private communica-
tion -have to withstand the test of voluntariness? The Supreme Court said 
that it does, but also held that there is a difference between this test 
and the one applied to determine the admissibility in evidence of a state-
ment made to a person in authority. The latter is far more stringent for 
obvious reasons, while the voluntariness of the consent to admission of 
intercepted communications must be "in the sense that it may not be the 
result of coercion". 
Said the Supreme Court: 
NOTE 
••rt must be the conscious act of the consenter, freely performed for 
reasons of his own which appear to him to be sufficient. The consent 
will not be vitiated, however, because the motives for it may be 
selfish or even reprehensible". 
Appeal by the accused dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
The Supreme Court of Canada sat with "a full house". Only one of the nine 
Justices dissented. He was of the opinion that the consent can only result 
in the evidence of the communication to be admissible against the con-
senter. He also favoured that there is no distinction between the volun-
tariness prerequisite to the admissibility in evidence of statements to a 
person in authority and the voluntariness to be proven to hold that there 
was consent to the admission of intercepted private communication. 
Written by John M. Post 
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LEGAL TIO-BITS 
(Written by John M. Post) 
March 1981 
In County Court in New Westminster an accused who elected to testify was 
cross-examined by Crown Counsel. It became relevant whether or not the 
accused had marks on his arm and he was asked to bare same. Defence 
counsel took issue and argued that this was a violation of the right 
against self crimination. 
The Court ruled it was no such violation and the accused was ordered to 
answer the Crown's question by complying. 
(R. v. Wilson February 1979). 
For some reason an information was found wanting and consequently quashed 
by the Court. The Crown proceeded with a new information. The charge was 
one which required certificates to be served on the accused by means of 
which essential ingredients to the of fence charged are proved. The accused 
claimed that the certificates served on him prior to the quashing of the 
information could not be used to prove their content and that new 
certificates should have been issued and served. Not so, held a Vancouver 
Island County Court Judge. Apparently the quashing of the information does 
not invalidate the certificates. 
(R. v. Miles December 1979). 
A person was by deceitful means persuaded to purchase real estate. The 
money was placed in trust with a third party and returned to the purchaser 
when he detected the deceit. The vendor was charged with fraud although 
the purchaser had all his money returned to him. The Vancouver County 
Court ruled that parting with money on false information for some 
considerable period is a sufficient detriment to consider that the person 
who parted with that money was defrauded. 
(R. v. Abramson, et. al. December 1979). 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that God has no granted rights nor any 
obligations and is therefore no person. As a consequence, communication 
with Him (prayer) is not private, and unauthorized interception of such 
communication does not render it inadmissible in evidence. 
(R. v. Davie September 1980) 
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Hugging is a wonderful means of expressing one's affection for another. 
One hugger who went somewhat overboard in expressing himself by this means 
(the hug lasted 3 minutes) found himself charged with a criminal offence by 
the huggee. It was alleged that the unappreciated gesture amounted to 
"confinement". The B.C. Court of Appeal held that being hugged against 
your will does not amount to confinement. 
(R. v. Calvin June 1980). 
A man drove 90 - 100 km/p.h. through a residential area. It was dark and 
there was evidence of other vehicular traffic on the streets. Such 
driving, said the B. C. Court of Appeal, amounts to dangerous driving under 
the Criminal Code of Canada. 
(R. v. Grube April 1980). 
Section 383 of the Criminal Code creates a crime for secret transactions 
with an agent (this includes an employee) to the detriment of the agent's 
principal (this includes an employer). This includes secret commissions, 
payment for favours, issuing of false receipts for expense accounts, etc. 
A man was charged with corruptly offering a benefit to an agent in 
consideration for a favour which would be to the detriment of the agent's 
principal. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that: 
1. Nothing needs to be done by the agent to make the offence complete; 
and 
2. the Crown need not show that an actual favour was granted the accused. 
The Court held that the corrupt intention and the effort to influence or 
reward the actual favour required are sufficient to prove the offence. 
(R. v •. Costgate October 1979). 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has held that calling Crown Counsel corrupt may 
amount to Contempt of Court. 
(R. v. Paul June 1980) 
A company employee suspected of stealing from her employer was questioned 
by the company's accountant. In these circumstances the accountant may 
have been seen by the accused as a person who may influence the path of 
prosecution and would as such, be a person in authority. The B. C. Court 
of Appeal held that a voir dire must be held concerning the statement. 
Sometimes a refusal to give a statement or explanation to police may be 
considered in assessing the accused's credibility. The B· C. Court of 
Appeal reiterated this but added that where the refusal results from 
instructions by counsel such consideration would be improper. 
(R. v. Dase February 1980) 
It has been held that where a suspected impaired driver had reasonable 
cause for believing that the outcome of an analysis of his breath could be 
inaccurate or unfair, he has a reasonable excuse to refuse to give a breath 
sample. A man who had been drinking since he drove his car, said that an 
analysis of his breath would be an inaccurate base from which to determine 
his blood-alcohol level at the time of driving. 
Not so, said the B. c. Court of Appeal. Such consumption is at most 
"evidence to the contrary", capable of rebutting the statutory presumption 
that the blood alcohol levels at the time of analysis and driving were 
equal. 
(R. v.· Lawrence - February 1980) 
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An alleged impaired driver had been served with xeroxed copies of the 
original certificates of the B.T.A. tests. The officer who made the copies 
said he looked at the copies to see if they were alright but did not check 
them in deta.il. This was sufficient evidence to show that the accused was 
served with "true copies" said a Vancouver County Court Judge. 
(R. v. Newman - February 1980) 
---------
When the accused was convicted of impaired driving the Crown sought a 
greater punishment due to one previous conviction. However, the second 
offence was committed on a date preceding the date on which the conviction 
for the first offence was entered. The accused apparently argued that this 
meant that when he committed the second offence he was still innocent of 
the first one and therefore no greater punishment could be imposed. A 
Vancouver County Court judge held that the prior conviction only has to be 
entered prior to the conviction for which greater punishment is sought 
(R. v. Bentley Keighton - June 1980). 
A person is not competent nor compellable to testify against his or her 
spouse. There are exceptions to this rule by statute (s.4(2) Canada 
Evidence Act) and at common law where the "liberty, health or person" of 
the witness was affected. A father did assault his six year old son in the 
presence of the mother, who charged her husband with assault. Defence 
counsel objected to the mother's testimony claiming that she was not a 
competent witness against her husband, as the offence charged was not 
included in s.4(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, nor was the alleged act one 
that had affected the "liberty, health or person" of the mother. The 
Courts held that the abuse by one parent on a child does affect the person, 
health or liberty of the other parent. "Would not a normal parent prefer 
to have themselves subjected to physical abuse rather than see their child 
suffer from the cruel acts of their spouse?". Furthermore, if the mother 
could not testify "there would be no way to vindicate the criminal law" in 
a case like this. 
(Regina v. MacPherson 52 c.c.c. (2d) 547) 
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The accused was involved in an accident and went home, arriving there 
shortly before police. While the officer made a demand for a sample of 
breath, the accused took a glass of whiskey in his hand obviously with the 
intent to drink it. When the officer said he would take the glass the 
accused smashed it against the officer's hand. 
The Courts held that it was the officer's duty to make the demand and that 
the accused's actions amounted to an attempt to obstruct the officer. 
(B. C. Court of Appeal September 1980 R. v. Soltys) 
When asked for breath samples a man is entitled to a telephone book, a 
telephone and a private area to contact counsel. 
As long as the suspected impaired driver makes a sincere effort to contact 
counsel and there is enough time within the two hour statutory limit he 
must be allowed to continue those efforts. 
Insisting on a sample of breath while the suspect is still trying to 
contact counsel within those conditions and limits, is unreasonable. 
(B. C. Court of Appeal - December 12, 1980 R v. Sanderson) 
When an item is proved to be a weapon, additional proof that it was carried 
concealed may lead to a criminal conviction. The criminal intent to be 
proved is not that the accused intended to conceal the weapon (a lead pipe 
in this case) but merely that he intended to put it in the place where it 
was concealed. 
(B. c. Court of Appeal - September 24, 1980 R. v. Lemire) 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the voluntariness prerequisite to 
the admissibility in evidence of a statement made by an accused to a person 
in authority goes beyond the mere absence of fear of prejudice or hope of 
advantage. Increased attempts to argue that such statements are 
involuntary for a sundry of reasons, are to be expected. 
Can self induced drunkeness on the part of an accused render his statement 
involuntary? 
The accused was not so drunk that she did not know what she was saying held 
the Court. In case of self induced intoxication where an otherwise 
voluntary statement has been made, the intoxication does not affect the 
voluntariness. However, the issue is whether, in such circumstances, the 
content of the statement is reliable to accept as proof of its content. To 
that end, it had to be determined if the accused had an "operating mind" 
to give her statement probative value. 
(B. C. Court of Appeal Nov. 4 1980 (R v. Richard) 
Driving without insurance and wrongful use of licence plates are offences 
of strict rather than absolute liability. Therefore an honest belief, 
based on reasonable and probable grounds that the manner of use in the 
circumstances was permissible, is a defence. 
(B. C. Court of Appeal December 2, 1980 R. v. Blackburn) 
An employee diverted to his own use money credits the company had with 
banks and customers thereby depriving his employer of the benefit of those 
credits. He was charged with theft of money. The accused argued that the 
Crown failed to prove he stole money. It was held that the deprivation was 
included in "anything" within the meaning of that word in s. 283( l)C.C. and 
furthermore that the money credits were "money" in exchange. 
(B. C~ Court of Appeal, November 20, 1980 Hardy v. The Queen) 
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If a suspected impaired driver consumes alcohol between the time of driving 
and the giving of breath samples, then what value has the evidence of the 
analyses? In such case the blood alcohol level at the time of analysis may 
not be assumed to be equal to that at the time of driving. The evidence of 
drinking since the driving is "evidence to the contrary" which destroys the 
well known presumption of equalization in s. 237(1)(c)C.C. However, a 
conviction may still result on the whole of the evidence. 
(B. C. Court of Appeal, October 28,· 1980, The Queen v. Kizan) 
Police successfully applied for an authorization to intercept private 
connnunications between the accused and his co-accused. They failed to 
reveal in the application that the interception was to take place while the 
two shared a cell. 
Although technically and formally all conditions of the law were complied 
with, the application was not "frank, full and fair". Such application 
must be made with scrupulous regard for obligations of the authorizing 
judge. The concealment of this information gave the trial judge a reason 
not to accept the authorization at face value. 
A new trial was ordered. 
(B. C. Court of Appeal, October 20, 1980, The Queen v. Gill) 
The Criminal Code requires that each sample of breath be taken not less 
than 15 minutes apart and as soon as practicable after the alleged offence 
has occurred. 
An accused claimed that where the two samples are taken 26 minutes apart, 
it means that the second sample was not taken as soon as practicable after 
the driving. 
Not ne~essarily so, said the Court. The words of the law must be given 
their plain meaning. The delay was in the circumstances not unreasonable• 
(B. C. Court of Appeal, September 29, 1980, The Queen v. Kaduk) 
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"Where one of two or more persons with the 
knowledge and consent of the rest has anything 
in his possession, it shall be deemed to be in 
the custody and possession of each and all of 
them". s. 3(4)(b) c.c. 
The accused was a passenger in a car. Another passenger threw stolen 
jewelry out the window when the car was stopped by police. The accused was 
convicted of possessing the stolen goods. He appealed claiming he did not 
possess the goods. In spite of the provision that knowledge and consent 
constitutes possesion, the Courts have held that the Crown must prove in 
addition that the accused had some measure of control over the goods and 
that his consent is more than a matter of "mere indifference or passive 
acquiescence". In the absenc.e of such evidence the accused cannot be 
convicted. 
(Ontario Court of Appeal - R v. Piaskoski - 52 c.c.c. (ed.) 316) 
The accused was convicted of armed robbery and appealed. During his trial 
a statement was admitted in evidence which the accused made to a police 
officer. Apparently the officer was in a position to issue a traffic 
ticket to the accused and promised not to do so in return for the accused 
giving him information regarding the robbery. The accused claimed the 
statement was inadmissible while the Crown claimed the contrary arguing 
that the hope of advantage was in regards to the ticket and not the 
robbery. The Court responded that it is irrelevant what the hope of 
advantage is in relation to: as long as the statement was made in response 
thereto, it is inadmissible. 
New trial ordered. 
(B. C. Court of Appeal, February 16, 1981 The Queen v. Kalashnikoff) 
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In his defence to a charge of "over .08%" the accused adduced in evidence 
the breathalyzer manual which stipulates that an accuracy test requires the 
standard alcohol solution to be within l degree C. of the room 
temperature. The Crown adduced evidence of an accuracy test but the 
technician had no knowledge of the two temperatures. 
The accused claimed that this raised a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of 
the breath analysis which in turn amounts to "evidence to the contrary" 
that the blood alcohol content at the time of driving and the analysis was 
the same. (s. 237 (l)(c) c.c.). 
Not so, decided the Supreme Court of Canada. The law (s. 237 C.C.) had 
been complied with and the technician's certificate was proof of its 
content. The analysis resulted in readings of .15% and the evidence raised 
by the defence was insufficient "evidence to the contrary" to raise a 
reasonable doubt. Evidence to the contrary must show an inaccuracy of such 
a degree that there is doubt that the blood alcohol content of the accused 
was over the allowable amount of .08%. 
(Regina v. Crosthwait 52 c.c.c. (2d) 129 May (1980) 
The B. C. Court of Appeal also dealt with the meaning of "evidence to the 
contrary" in s. 237 (l)(c)C.C. The law states that the certificate of a 
technician is proof of the blood alcohol content unless there is evidence 
to the contrary. The Court held that even when there is evidence to the 
contrary with "probative value and cogency" the effect of t;:.he certificate 
remains evidence although, no longer proof. All the evidence in such case 
must be weighed and a conclusion of fact reached. The accused's appeal was 
dismissed. 
(R. v. Mooney, November 1980) 
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Accused picked up two girls who testified that, on account of being 
threatened by accused with a knife, they engaged in sexual activities with 
him. 
The accused said he had only placed, in the presence of the girls, a knife 
in the glove compartment to have it out of the way. He advanced the new 
"Papajohn" defence that he had an hone~t mistaken belief that the girls 
consented. 
The Court held that "'the defence was deprived of all sense of reality" in 
this case. This in spite of holding the view that where consent is 
obtained by "fear of bodily harm" rather than by "threats", it is more 
likely that the accused would be mistaken as to consent. 
(The Queen v. Trottier B. c •. Court of Appeal March 1981) 
The accused, a "foolish and arrogant 18 year old", told a police officer in 
colourful terms that he would not blow when stopped and demanded to 
accompany and give a sample of breath. At the police station he again 
responded in no uncertain terms that no sample was forthcoming. He refused 
a third time when the breathalyzer was ready to receive his sample. 
At his trial the accused testified that after the second refusal he had 
requested to phone counsel but was denied this right. As tenuous as his 
evidence was, the trial judge accepted it but convicted the accused. This 
by virtue of a B. C. binding precedent (R. v. Rowe 1973 12 c.c.c. (2d) 24) 
which establishes that once a person has refused, the offence is complete. 
In other words, before he asked for counsel he had already committed the 
offence of refusing. 
The Appeal Court Judge agreed, but held that since the accused was not 
charged after the first or second refusal and the breathalyzer had been 
readied, the officers had obviously not taken the refusal of this foolish 
boy seriously. Therefore, the third refusal had to be considered in 
isolation. In view of the denial to obtain counsel the accused had a 
reasonable excuse to refuse giving the sample. 
(Kostiniuk v. The Queen, New Westminster County Court February 1980) 
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A B. c. Municipal Constable made a misleading statement claiming that he 
was on annual leave while in fact he was not. Apparently to accommodate 
this falsehood, he omitted to carry out an administrative duty. As a 
consequence, he was convicted of a disciplinary default, to wit deceit, and 
received a one day suspension. He appealed this conviction and sentence to 
the B. c. Police Commission. 
Form 3, by means of which disciplinary hearings under the B. c. Police Act 
are commenced, is analogous to an information in the procedures for summary 
conviction offences. 
The Municipal Constable appealed on two grounds: 
1. The form 3 was "duplicitous" as it alleged in one count, the making of 
a misleading statement and the failure of an administrative duty; and 
2. The allegation failed to contain the essential words "wilfully and/or 
negligently". 
The B. c. Police Commission unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the 
sentence as appropriate. 
The content of form 3 was not found to be duplicitous. The constable was 
charged with one disciplinary default only - deceit. This was the 
gravamen of the charge and the misleading statement and the administrative 
omission were mere means by which this one default was committed. 
In regards to the omission of the words wilfully and/or negligently, the 
Commission held that the constable was reasonably informed of the 
transactions against him. There was nothing in the format or wording of 
the form that inhibited the Constable from making a full defence or that 
jeopardized his right to a fair trial. 
(Judge R. s. McQueen, Chairman B. C. Police Commission March 25, 1981). 
